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
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U.S. national strategy and Army doctrine establish the need for, and value of, coalitions and alliances in the post-cold war era. While NATO retains its value to U.S. national interests in Europe, the lack of a common threat now is producing a different Alliance. If the Alliance is to survive and remain meaningful, an understanding of NATO and its political subtleties is essential. To provide a wider understanding of the changed nature of the Alliance, the author examines the current policies of France and Germany, the two largest continental NATO powers, toward NATO.

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Strategic Outreach Roundtable Paper
and Conference Report

GERMANY, FRANCE AND NATO

Dr. Peter Schmidt

With a Summary of Discussion by:
Ms Maria Alongi

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U.S. Army War College



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and Conference Report**

GERMANY, FRANCE AND NATO

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Ebenhausen, FRG**

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Foreign Policy Consultant**

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
This document was edited by Dr. Thomas-Durell Young and LTC William T. Johnsen of the Strategic Studies Institute, who served as organizers of this roundtable. This report is approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.

FOREWORD

U.S. national strategy and U.S. Army doctrine explicitly establish the overwhelming need for, and value of, coalitions and alliances in the post-cold war era. Two generations of U.S. civil officials and military officers have been inculcated with the precept of NATO's importance to security and stability in Europe. Free of the confines of the cold war competing national interests and different national perceptions have transformed the Alliance. While NATO retains its value to U.S. national interests in Europe, the lack of a common threat now is producing a different Alliance. Clearly, if the Alliance is to survive and remain meaningful, an understanding of NATO and its political subtleties will be essential.

To provide a wider understanding of the changed nature of the Alliance, Dr. Peter Schmidt of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Ebenhausen, Germany, examines the current policies of France and Germany, the two largest continental NATO powers, toward NATO. Dr. Schmidt presented this paper in June 1994 to a roundtable sponsored by the American Institute for Contemporary Germany Studies and the Chief of Staff of the Army's Strategic Outreach Program. Approximately two dozen European experts participated in this roundtable ably recorded by Ms Maria Alongi.

On behalf of the Strategic Studies Institute, I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies for co-sponsoring this profitable exchange.



EARL H. TILFORD, JR.
Director of Research
Strategic Studies Institute

SUMMARY

Rapporteur: Maria R. Alongi

I. European Perspectives on NATO.

- During NATO's recent evolution, two major perspectives have emerged in Europe. One, espoused most prominently by Germany, holds that NATO should provide the framework for U.S.-European security relations. In this view, the European security identity should be subordinate to NATO. The other major viewpoint, represented by France, holds that NATO should eventually give way to a more distinct European relationship on matters of security that need not be expressed in a NATO framework.
- In the opinion of some, closer cooperation between France and NATO's integrated military command, although mutually beneficial, is aimed at facilitating the development of a closer bilateral relationship between France and the Alliance. Arrangements such as the Combined/Joint Task Forces (C/JTF) can further this goal by allowing NATO resources to be used by a European security entity, such as the Western European Union (WEU), when the latter wishes to act without the United States in a crisis situation.
- Many European countries, including the United Kingdom, have accepted the objective of a European security identity embodied in the Maastricht Treaty. Although not all European allies share this vision of transatlantic security relations, their interest in promoting further integration in the European Union may lead to the same outcome.
- No conceptual link has been made, however, between the process of developing a Common European Foreign and Security Policy and the development of NATO.

Unless this link is made explicitly, the result will be a bilateral security relationship between the United States and Europe outside the framework of the Alliance.

II. France and NATO.

- The French position on NATO has evolved since 1990. France has moved toward closer military cooperation with NATO, as demonstrated, for example, by the subordination of French troops in the EUROCORPS to SACEUR when a crisis demands it.
- Yet France has also undertaken a series of initiatives that mirror NATO activities in Central and Eastern Europe. Some have perceived these actions as intended to balance NATO's influence in this region and in European security affairs more generally. The association agreements reached by the European Union and the WEU with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, for example, appear to be European alternatives to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). In addition, the Stability Pact proposed by French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur seems aimed at counterbalancing NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP).
- On the other hand, the French policy shift regarding NATO also reflects the altered transatlantic political and security context. The change in administration in France, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and the problems encountered in the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty have brought about adjustments in French foreign policy priorities.
- The new French approach toward NATO reflects a calculation that the new European political and security environment requires a continued U.S. presence on the continent. This, in turn, requires a recognition of the future role of NATO, the vehicle for U.S. involvement in Europe, in European security.

- The evolution of transatlantic security relations toward a bilateral U.S.-European relationship is occurring *de facto* because of the difficulty in reaching consensus among the 16 members of NATO in response to the conflict in Bosnia. The individual actors agreed to commit troops after bilateral consultations.

III. Future Security Relationships.

- Transatlantic security arrangements are likely to evolve toward a "variable geometry" pattern, with groups of NATO countries forming *ad hoc* coalitions in response to particular crisis situations. The C/JTF arrangement is designed to accommodate this potential development.
- The French accept the development of a "variable geometry" approach to European security and have supported the C/JTF plan on the basis of WEU's access to it. Security relationships in this new context, however, will not necessarily reflect current patterns. The strong Franco-German partnership in security matters may not carry over into the future. Greater cooperation may develop between France and the United Kingdom, particularly in nuclear matters, as indicated in the French White Paper on defense.
- In addition, French and German security interests may diverge. Germany is increasingly concerned about the political and economic stability of regions east of its borders. It has provided 40 percent of total Western financial aid to Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. With its resources tied to economic assistance to the East, Germany may find itself less capable and less inclined to sustain its leadership on European security matters with France.
- Germany's concern with promoting stability in Central and Eastern Europe may also result in a more flexible German relationship with NATO and Western Europe more generally. In addition, it may lead to the development of a bilateral relationship with Russia.

- This will not mean a renationalization of German security policy. Although Germany recently intervened as a national actor in U.N. operations in Cambodia and Somalia, the need to integrate German foreign and security policy within a wider European framework remains deeply entrenched in the German political consciousness.
- Since Adenauer, Germany has followed policies that embed it firmly in European political and economic integration. The Kohl government continues this course. When Germany began the transition to unification, it pressed to further the integration of the European Union, to make a unified Germany more palatable. In addition, because Kohl viewed NATO as evolving into a looser structure, he promoted the WEU, which he perceived as more viable in the long term.
- Furthermore, a potential change in government will not alter the German commitment to a European policy. The Social Democratic Party (SDP) and its possible coalition partner, the Green Party, both favor European integration.
- With the prospect of EU enlargement, however, the character of the European Union is changing. The eventual accession of Central and East European states comports changes to the decisionmaking process of the European Union, its spending, and policies. It will be a much more diverse organization and one less likely to achieve consensus easily.
- A more independent German approach to foreign and security policy may, thus, result not from a proclivity to act outside a wider European framework, but from a potentially looser European Union.
- French security interests are tied less to developments in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. For France, a more immediate goal remains developing European security structures and the capability to intervene in regional crises where European

interests are at stake. Ironically, France is now confronted by a Europe less able, and perhaps less willing, to act than originally intended by the European Community when it sought to establish a Common Foreign and Security Policy.

- The failure of the European Union to intervene meaningfully in the Yugoslavia crisis highlights the need for France to look outside of Europe for a strategic partner. The unexpected result has been, and may continue to be, a closer relationship with the United States.

IV. The U.S. Role in Europe.

- There is strong support in both France and Germany for a continued, prominent U.S. role in European security. Germany traditionally has endorsed U.S. presence for security and political reasons. The German White Paper on defense restates this position. Given its current limitations on military capabilities and diversion of financial resources, German support for a U.S. role in Europe will continue.
- The crisis in Bosnia highlighted for French policymakers the need for continued U.S. involvement in European security matters. As stated above, the inability to muster a meaningful European response to the conflict in the Balkans, particularly from Germany and the United Kingdom, convinced the French of the importance of having the United States as a partner in developing a viable strategy towards Bosnia.
- French support for a U.S. role in Europe, however, is not necessarily coincident with support for a preeminent role for NATO in European security. In the French view, the United States should become a bilateral partner to the European Union on security matters.

V. NATO Membership Expansion.

- Due to the economic imbalance between Western Europe and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the early enlargement of the European Union is unlikely. The enlargement of NATO, however, is both possible and desirable.
- Extending full NATO membership to Central and East European Countries will provide a framework for their continued integration into the West, which the EU currently cannot provide. In addition, expanding NATO membership now will avoid dealing with the issue at a time of crisis, when tensions probably would be heightened by extending the influence of the Alliance eastward.
- The question of NATO's relationship with Russia has been a more difficult issue within the Alliance. The prospect of a reversal to authoritarian government or Russian intervention in its "near abroad" has led to uncertainty about NATO's future relationship with Russia.
- PfP is a successful compromise between two very different views on this issue. It allows NATO to form a relationship with Russia and thus avoids creating a new dividing line on the European continent. On the other hand, it preserves the integrity of NATO's core functions in the event of an undemocratic turn in Russia or of Russian aggressive policies in the near abroad.

VI. Challenges to Future Transatlantic Cooperation.

- If transatlantic security relations evolve into a bilateral arrangement involving the United States on one side and a European entity, perhaps the WEU or the EU, on the other, the challenge for both sides will be to facilitate the development of Europe into a viable strategic partner for the United States.

- Currently, Europe lacks certain capabilities, including strategic airlift and intelligence assets. In addition, defense spending in Europe has been on a steady decline. German spending, for example, fell from 2.6 percent of GDP to 1.6 percent. This situation may ignite a new burden-sharing debate in the U.S. Congress.
- On the other hand, in the current geopolitical context, it is in U.S. interests to retain Europe as a strategic partner. Thus, both sides must work together to ensure that the transatlantic relationship does not deteriorate as Europe builds its security identity. This will require analyzing transatlantic relations not in terms of burden-sharing, but responsibility-sharing.
- The contribution of Europe to the continent's stability must be viewed in a wider, more strategic context. And, the contribution of the European allies to transatlantic security must include an assessment of expenditures and efforts aimed at stabilizing Central and Eastern Europe.

GERMANY, FRANCE AND NATO

Peter Schmidt

Introduction.

Current German and French relations with NATO are subject to (at least) two different interpretations. Due to the special role France has played since 1966 inside (and outside) the Atlantic Alliance, the main difference between these two views is the way in which the French relationship with the Alliance is perceived today.

The dominant school of thought maintains that France has gotten much closer to NATO.¹ This has paved the way for a new transatlantic bargain which enables the Alliance to undertake new missions. As proof for this new French attitude toward NATO, proponents of this interpretation point out that France has endorsed the following collective defense and collective security missions:

- the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC),
- Partnership for Peace (PfP),
- NATO-sponsored peace operations,
- SACEUR's "operational command" of the EUROCORPS when agreed to by the participating countries.
- Moreover, France is participating in Military Committee discussions related to peacekeeping operations.

This school of thought also holds that Germany, while remaining fully committed to NATO's military integration and political structure, has played an essential role in this change in French policy by dampening traditional Franco-American rivalries. Hence, some argue that Bonn has helped considerably to draw France closer into the Alliance's reform

process than French political instincts may have accepted without this German effort.

U.S. support in January 1994 for European endeavors to develop a European security and defense identity is another important milestone in drawing France closer to NATO.² According to this interpretation, the basis has been laid for a new transatlantic bargain which now allows a new and stable strategic partnership between Europe and North America in the post-cold war era.

The minority school of thought evaluates the relationship among France, Germany and NATO in a different way. This school argues that France has gotten what it has wanted.³ From this school's perspective, NATO's role and functions in today's overall security structure fits much better into traditional French interests and views than those of former days. Thus, France actively pursued this policy based on its own national interests. The proponents of this position argue that France remains apart from NATO's military integration and maintains its special status, while NATO's political role, a matter of constant French complaints, has diminished. Major political decisions are taken outside the Atlantic Alliance, e.g., like in the Security Council of the U.N., on a bilateral basis between the United States and the EU (within the context of its Command Foreign and Security Policy), or within flexible groupings. Even those taken within the Alliance are done in the North Atlantic Council where France remained even after its departure from the integrated military structure. Moreover, there is a clear tendency to separate political negotiation structures from implementing institutions (where NATO belongs more and more), while increasingly having to vie with new competitors in this field. In other words, NATO's role is more or less limited to the implementation of political decisions taken elsewhere.

Against the argument that NATO has assumed collective security functions (i.e., NACC and PfP),⁴ proponents of this interpretation argue that these new political functions remain limited by the CSCE framework and by the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy initiatives toward eastern Europe (e.g., the stability pact plan as offered by French Prime Minister

Edouard Balladur).⁵ Moreover, according to this more modest view, the EUROCORPS-SACEUR agreement is not an indicator of a major French rapprochement toward NATO. Rather, it represents an extension of Gaullist policy of a limited relationship between NATO and other European nations, especially Germany, but also Spain and Belgium, who are participating in the EUROCORPS.

Furthermore, these observers contend that even where the Alliance has a political role to play, France has successfully restrained NATO's reach by promoting parallel European institutions. NACC, offered to all former Warsaw Pact countries in November 1991, for example, has been succeeded by the Consultative Forum of WEU, created in June 1992, and the Balladur plan a year later. And, the European answer to NATO's PfP has been the creation of associate partner status for Central European countries with WEU.

Finally, certain analysts have argued that Germany's overall relationship with NATO has shifted toward the French position. Certainly, most of the *Bundeswehr* remains assigned to NATO, but, by and large, Germany has gone along with Paris by accepting the French type of NATO relationship, e.g., in the framework of the EUROCORPS and by double-hatting military forces to both NATO and WEU.

Thus, from this perspective, since the Alliance's January 1994 Summit, the United States has opted not to play an important role in the Alliance. Furthermore, the United States has acquiesced to French leadership in European security affairs by accepting the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy and WEU's policy of independence. The Alliance's new policy of providing NATO assets for European-led operations, which only further accentuates NATO's future insignificance, lends credence to this view.

Schools of Thought Put To the Test.

A reasonable way to test these two lines of interpretation in a differentiated fashion is to ascertain their different approaches to three key roles and functions of the Atlantic Alliance:

- Collective defense role (Article 5 of the Washington Treaty),
- Cooperative security functions, i.e., NACC and PfP, and,
- NATO's role in regional crisis management.

Collective Defense. The German Defense White Paper argues that collective defense remains the key function of the Alliance.⁶ For Germany, this position justifies the continued existence of the integrated military structure of NATO, in which Germany plays a major role. This pronouncement is also meant to stem criticism of shifts in German security policy which might be interpreted as leading towards a renationalization of German defense policy. Thus, until recently, German leaders have emphasized Article IV of the WEU Treaty which declares as undesirable any duplication of NATO and WEU military staffs and deferring to NATO authorities. With WEU's Petersberg Declaration of June 1992, however, Germany has accepted that one of WEU's tasks is the collective defense of the WEU countries.⁷

Nevertheless, the WEU has not yet developed a functioning operational structure suitable for this task. The recently established WEU Planning Cell is too small to fulfil this function. In addition, the regular meetings of Chiefs of Defense Staff cannot overcome the lack of a permanent WEU military headquarters.⁸ On a practical level, NATO remains the only framework within which the collective defense of the Western European countries can be reasonably executed.⁹

NATO's importance, however, is diminished by a number of factors:

- Due to the end of a direct threat to Western Europe by the Warsaw Pact there is a perception of a reduced importance of collective defense missions. NATO's concentration on collective defense, therefore, only adds to the lessened political standing of NATO.
- The readiness to develop an operational role for WEU,¹⁰ which includes the dual-hatting of NATO forces,¹¹ detracts attention from the Atlantic Alliance, and might

reduce the number of exercises and the intensity of interaction among the armed forces within the NATO framework.

- The endorsement of the traditional French type of relationship with NATO (e.g., the Lemnitzer-Ailleret agreements and others)¹² in EUROCORPS affairs could reduce the importance of NATO procedures in the military field.
- Due to the newly-assumed long warning time available to Alliance members, there is even less reason to contribute forces to, let alone participate in, the integrated command structure.

In sum, as regards NATO's collective defense function, the French attitude has not changed. France still accepts NATO's role in this field, but remains apart from NATO's integrated military structure. Thus, those hoping for change in French policy toward NATO may be disappointed. The only, if indeed minor French concession in this regard is that of the command relationship of the EUROCORPS with NATO. Whereas the Lemnitzer-Ailleret agreement specifies that French forces should come only under the operational control of SACEUR, the EUROCORPS-SACEUR arrangement place the French forces within this formation under SACEUR's operational command.

The nature of the French and German relationship with NATO today is, therefore, determined much more by the new functions and missions of the Alliance with regard to cooperative security and NATO's role as a mandate organization of the United Nations in a collective security framework.

The cooperative security dimension. The first practical step in institutionalizing the cooperative security function was the creation of the NACC in December 1991, which included the former Warsaw Pact member countries.¹³ This proposal was based on a German-American initiative, as Germany in particular was keen to provide the Alliance with an all-European function for at least two reasons:

- to establish a framework to push disarmament by including the former Warsaw Pact countries into a joint institutional framework,¹⁴ and
- to make German unification more "digestible" for its Eastern neighbors (especially Russia) by attaching these states to a formerly purely Western organization.

France, however, held very skeptical views on this development. In Paris, the NACC has been seen mostly as a German-American attempt to provide NATO with new political missions in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, it was highly symbolic that the initiative bypassed France, while encouraging Washington to become a "partner in leadership."¹⁵ President Mitterrand's statement following the Rome summit in December 1991 was typical of French attitudes in this regard. Isolated after his criticism of NACC and NATO reform, he said: "I didn't know that NATO has a political role to play." Nevertheless, having no coalition partners to turn to in this matter, France slowly accepted this new political role for the Alliance.¹⁶

However, at the same time, France successfully strove to develop countermeasures to balance and downgrade NATO's increased political reach. These initiatives were based much more on Realpolitik than the all-European concept of NATO, as they aimed only at extending Western Europe's influence toward Central Europe, while excluding Eastern Europe. Thus, the WEU's Consultative Forum and the EU's European Agreements have been based on the understanding that only a belt of countries from the Baltic states to Romania fall within a zone of EU-influence, whereas NACC included all former Warsaw Pact countries. Later, the WEU offered associate partnership status, again only to this group of countries,¹⁷ whereas participation in NATO's PfP program is open to all European countries.¹⁸ While Germany is interested in stabilizing this potential crisis area, France was motivated to support this policy because it saw these measures as a counterpoise against NATO's influence in Central Europe.

Though NATO's capabilities are much more extensive than those of the WEU, and, therefore, provide more opportunities

for Central and East European countries, the WEU has a double advantage. First, the WEU is able to concentrate on nine countries. Second, close relations with WEU are regarded as a means to improve the chances of these states for EU membership.

NATO's role in regional crisis management. One of the reasons why Germany still considers NATO as its primary multilateral military organization has resulted from the problem of using German armed forces outside NATO. Until the German constitutional court in June 1994 decided to permit the employment of German forces outside the NATO area, a well-established political interpretation of the German Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*) proscribed the possibility of employing the *Bundeswehr* outside of NATO's scope. In addition to this problem, NATO (due in large part to significant American military capabilities in crucial areas) has been seen as the only effective military multilateral organization for possible "out-of-area-missions."¹⁹ The German government has been, therefore, quite keen not only to maintain NATO's traditional collective defense function, but also to give the Alliance a role in regional crisis management, well beyond the NATO area.

France, on the other hand, driven by its traditional, restrictive understanding of NATO as a collective defense organization of last-resort, accepted this new task for NATO only with great reluctance. Again, the French have been willing to support a regional crisis role of NATO beyond the alliance's traditional area only when the European partners create measures to counterbalance NATO. This policy is clearly laid down in the new French White Paper on Defense, where the French government pointedly repeats the Gaullist principles of 1966, while indicating that it will take part in NATO's reform primarily where these efforts promote the development of independent European security and defense structures.²⁰

An expression of this French policy is found in the WEU's 1992 Petersberg declaration. Thus, at least on paper, WEU became legitimized to undertake military actions of all kinds. These include the defense of Europe and peace operations. The latter of these can be undertaken without the explicit

consent of the U.N. Security Council; instead they can be based solely on Article 5 of the U.N. Charter.²¹

Germany supported this policy under two conditions:²²

- NATO should maintain collective defense as one of its key functions, and
- WEU should intervene only in regional crises when NATO is not prepared to act.

In reality, however, WEU activities have paralleled NATO activities or the WEU has acted alone. For example, in the Adriatic, "NATO" and "WEU" ships enforce the U.N. embargo in parallel actions under a common command and, supposedly, under the joint political control of NATO and the WEU Council.²³ NATO has enforced the no-fly zone over Bosnia, but, on the Danube, the WEU controls actions in a complementary way. In addition, many military activities, especially on the soil of the former Yugoslavia, have been undertaken under the auspices of the U.N. and beyond the scope of both institutions. Here again, France tries to balance NATO's reach by supporting the establishment of a greater military expertise for the Secretary General of the United Nations.²⁴

To understand the changing role of NATO, it is indispensable to recall NATO's traditional basis of strength: the strong political-military link built into its institutional structure. This, however, is changing. France very much favors a bilateral European-U.S. relationship inside the Alliance, where the European side is based on the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. Germany, by and large, accepts this view.²⁵ It needs to be recalled, however, that this does not hinder France from maintaining very close bilateral relations with the United States.

Assessing the Bosnian affair underscores this major change. Most of the negotiations, as in the case of the so-called "action plan" for Bosnia, are going on between the EU and the United States. Other major frameworks include the U.N. Security Council and the Contact Group consisting of Russia, the United States, France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

This development weakens the political functions of the Atlantic Alliance. In addition, there is an overall tendency to separate negotiating structures from implementing institutions, which works to NATO's disadvantage as can be demonstrated in the Bosnian "case."

Negotiating a political settlement.

- effected by states on a unilateral basis, primarily the United States,²⁶
- effected by the U.N. in cooperation with the EU (Stoltenberg, Owen), as well as the EU on a unilateral basis,²⁷ and
- through ad-hoc structures (the London Contact Group, International Conference on Former Yugoslavia).

Implementation and control of certain measures.

- United Nations: peacekeeping and possibly enforcement, humanitarian and economic aid, arms control;
- CSCE: monitoring, conflict prevention in nearby areas;
- EU: monitoring, conflict prevention, economic sanctions and incentives, humanitarian aid;
- WEU: embargo control, limited peace operations; and,
- NATO: monitoring, embargo control, peace operations.

Certainly, the above situation is caused not only by French policy ambitions. The momentum also stems from objective trends in the international system and the necessity to include Russia in these endeavors in order to find political solutions for regional problems. Nevertheless, since 1992 a certain French political strategy is discernible which can be understood as a multiple bi- and multilateralism, one aim of which is to downgrade NATO's political reach.²⁸

Conclusions.

In summary, I am inclined to support the argument that changed security conditions in Europe have allowed France to pursue initiatives that limit NATO's role and potential for success. In the field of collective defense, NATO today has a looser structure than in former days. But even under these changed circumstances France does not participate in the Alliance's military structure. With regard to cooperative security NATO has attracted new functions, but France has ensured that in cases with a purely European character, the EU and WEU balance NATO's possibilities.

Although NATO members accepted a new Alliance role in regional crises beyond the traditional NATO geographical area, other parallel European institutions such as the CSCE also have developed. The main political trend points to a bilateral European-American relationship outside NATO, which perfectly fits into traditional French interests. The new French White Paper on Defense is quite clear in this regard: priority is given to the development of Europe as a strategic actor; NATO plays only a secondary role. The key question remains whether this result is good or bad for Atlantic relations. And what are the problems of a relationship where European interests meet American interests in a fully organized way?

The first difficulty is that the actors involved, the EU and the United States, are of different character. The EU with its Common Foreign and Security Policy still is an intergovernmental framework with its odd moments of "communitarianism." The United States represents an integrated structure (where certainly indecisiveness and lack of coordination are constant features), but with the constant potential for structuring decisive guidance. This situation brings about a structural tendency for frictions and misunderstandings.

A second problem is that a bilateral structure renders NATO's political fora obsolete. A new structure, which reflects this bilateralism, would be the logical consequence. This structure might be based on similar regulations like the EU-U.S. bilateral talks based on the agreement of 1990.²⁹ This

might encourage a tendency to regard NATO solely as a military "tool box"; a trend which was advanced by the agreement during NATO's January 1994 summit that WEU should have access to NATO assets, including Combined/Joint Task Force structures. One may argue that bureaucratic inertia may give NATO a good chance to survive with such a limited function. My view, however, is that NATO could hardly stay alive if the military structures are not embedded into a functioning political framework which is able to create the necessary political consensus for possible military actions. Hence, there is a need for a consensus-stimulating institutional framework in which political procedures are able to overcome, at least to a certain extent, the differences of interest between the nations involved.

Despite all talk of an independent West European capability for regional actions beyond NATO, there is no doubt that the West European countries will be unable to mobilize the resources necessary to realize this option in the near future. The reason for this is due in part to a lack of combat force multipliers in such key areas as command, control, communication and intelligence, as well as in the field of strategic transport. This will hardly change at a time when almost all countries want to enjoy a peace dividend.³⁰ Taking into account the likely need to address the issue of anti-ballistic missile defense, a very costly proposition, reasonable doubts about far-reaching European independence of military action exist. This might explain why France is still ready to accept NATO's existence and to exploit, like in the case of Bosnia, its capabilities. Nevertheless, the impression prevails that France continues to try to downgrade the Alliance's political (and military) functions as far as possible and to bypass NATO's political structure by putting much more emphasis on other fora and even on a prosperous bilateral French-American relationship.³¹

ENDNOTES

1. With regard to this view on French politics, see Michael Meimeth, "France Gets to NATO," *The World Today*, Vol. 50, No. 5, May 1994, pp. 84-85; and, Philip H. Gordon, *Die Deutsch-Französische Partnerschaft und die Atlantische Allianz*, Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik

(Europa-Union Verlag Bonn) 1994. For the official view see Wolfgang Ischinger, "Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Thesen zur deutsch-französischen Vorreiterrolle" in Ingo Kolboom, ed., *Frankreich in Europa: ein deutsch-französischer Rundblick* (Europa Union Verlag, Bonn) 1993.

2. The decisive sentences in the declaration of the NATO Summit Meeting are:

We support strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance through the Western European Union, which is being developed as the defence component of the European Union. The Alliance's organization and resources will be adjusted so as to validate this . . . We therefore stand ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy.

See "Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council," January 10-11, 1994, Bruxelles, NATO Press Service, Press Communiqué M-1(94)3, January 11, 1994.

3. This group is much more diverse than the first one. Major elements of the "ideal typus" can be found in: Erich Hauser, "Geschicktes Fingerspiel auf vier Klavieren" in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, June 8, 1993, p. 7; Roland Höhne, "Frankreichs Stellung in der Welt. Weltmacht oder Mittelmacht" in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament, B 47-48/91, November 15, 1991, pp. 37-46; and, Peter Schmidt, "French Security Policy Ambitions," *Aussenpolitik*, No. 4, 1993, pp. 334-343.

4. See "Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council"; and, "Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Istanbul", June 9, 1994, Bruxelles, NATO Press Service, Press Communiqué M-NAC-1(94)46, June 9, 1994.

5. See "Concluding Document of the Inaugural Conference for a Pact on Stability in Europe", Paris, May 26-27, 1994.

6. Federal Ministry of Defence, *White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr*, Bonn, April 5, 1994, p. 50.

7. See *Bulletin of the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government*, Bonn, No. 68, June 23, 1992, pp. 649-655.

8. For a critical assessment of the capacity of the WEU Planning Cell, see Assembly of the Western European Union, *The WEU Planning Cell*,

Document 1421, 19th May 1994, First Part, Fortieth Ordinary Session, Report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Rapporteur.

9. The WEU has the authority to activate operational headquarters in case there is a real need for one. Nevertheless, the WEU has to draw on existing NATO staffs to do so in an efficient way.

10. This includes the creation of a Planning Cell, the establishment of a Satellite Centre for the interpretation of satellite data and meetings of the Chiefs of Defense Staff at least twice a year before the Ministerial Councils of WEU.

11. Nevertheless, the member countries have only reluctantly made "forces answerable to WEU" (FAWEU). Currently FAWEU consists of the EUROCORPS (French, German, Belgian and Spanish forces), the Multinational Division Center (Belgian, British, Dutch and German units), and the UK-Netherlands amphibious force.

12. The Lemnitzer-Ailleret agreement of 1967 was the first agreement made between the French Chief of Defense Staff and the SACEUR after France left the NATO military integrated command structure. This agreement served as the basis for the possible participation of French forces in the defense of Germany and clarified in a detailed manner the specific role French forces could play in a war in Germany (reserve function), specific military operations which French forces would be ready to undertake in case of a Warsaw Pact attack, and the command and control arrangements in this case.

13. Following the "Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation," Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Rome, November 7-8, 1991, Bruxelles, NATO Press Service, Press Communiqué S-1(91)86, November 8, 1991.

14. The creation of an international environment providing a positive framework for unification represented an outstanding German interest. This included the implementation of the treaty on conventional disarmament.

15. See George Bush, Speech at the Rheingold-Halle Mainz, May 31, 1989.

16. For greater details for this period see Peter Schmidt, "Partners and Rivals: NATO, WEU, EC and the Reorganization of European Security Policy: Taking Stock" in Peter Schmidt, ed., *In the Midst of Change: Approaches to West European Security and Defence Cooperation* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1992) pp. 187-228.

17. See the Kirchberg Declaration of WEU of May 9, 1994.

26. See the Croatian-Muslim Agreements under the sponsorship of the United States, signed March, 1, 1994. *U.S. Policy Information and Texts*, No. 25, March 3, 1994.

27. See, for example, the EU's action plan of November 1993 in *Atlantic News*, No. 2573, November 24, 1993, p. 2.

28. For a detailed elaboration of this thesis, see my article, "French Security Policy Ambitions," pp. 335-343.

29. See Declaration on EC-US Relations, *Europe Documents*, No. 1622, November 23, 1990.

30. Only France plans to increase slightly its military expenditures in the years to come. All other European states will experience substantial cuts in defense expenditures.

31. See, for example, the report on the French-American "rapprochement" in the case of Serbia in *Le Figaro*, February 1994, p. 4.